2020

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São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Na organização das informações textuais, as expressões sublinhadas em “ A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas” (1.^o parágrafo) e “Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano” (4.^o parágrafo) têm, respectivamente, a função de:

Leia o texto para responder

São Paulo – Os olhos do Brasil e do mundo se voltam para a maior floresta tropical e maior reserva de biodiversidade da Terra. Milhares de mensagens de alerta em diferentes línguas circulam nas redes sociais com a hashtag #PrayForAmazonia. A razão não poderia ser pior: a Amazônia arde em chamas.
O bioma é o mais afetado pela maior onda de incêndios florestais no Brasil em sete anos. Não há novidade no fenômeno em si. A Amazônia sempre sofreu com queimadas ligadas à exploração de terra. Mas como isso chegou tão longe? Segundo dados do Inpe, o número de focos de incêndio florestal aumentou 83% entre janeiro e agosto de 2019 na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018. Desde 1.o de janeiro até a terça-feira [20.08.2019] foram contabilizados 74 155 focos, alta de 84% em relação ao mesmo período do ano passado. É o número mais alto desde que os registros começaram, em 2013. A última grande onda é de 2016, com 66 622 focos de queimadas nesse período. Combinado a períodos de seca severa, o desmatamento e a prática de queimadas podem gerar um saldo final incendiário. O que causa estranheza aos especialistas nos eventos de 2019, porém, é que a seca não se mostra tão severa como nos anos anteriores e tampouco houve eventos climáticos extremos, como o El Niño, que justifiquem um aumento considerável nos focos de incêndio. Além disso, os tempos de seca mais severos ocorrem geralmente no mês de setembro. Ou seja: a mão do homem pesou, e muito, para a alta neste ano.

(Vanessa Barbosa. “Inferno na floresta: o que sabemos sobre os
incêndios na Amazônia”. https://exame.abril.com.br, 23.08.2019.
Adaptado.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Read the text

There’s something faintly embarrassing about the 50^th anniversary of the first moonwalk. It was just so long ago. It’s no longer “we” who put a man on the moon, it’s “they” who put a man on the moon. So why can’t “we” do it? It’s hard not to feel that for all the technological advances of the last halfcentury, America has lost something — the ability to unite and overcome long odds to achieve greatness.
At one level, this is silly. The U.S. stopped going to the moon because Americans stopped seeing the point of it, not because they stopped being capable of it. Still, the historic Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs do have something to teach us. Months before the moon landing, the journal Science wrote that the space program’s “most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” So, here, lessons the Apollo has left behind.
1. _____________ President John Kennedy simplified NASA’s job with his 1961 address to Congress committing to “the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth.” From then on, any decision was made by whether it would aid or impede the agency in meeting that deadline. Experiments that were too heavy were shelved, however valuable they might have been. Technologies that were superior but not ready for deployment were set aside. Having a North Star to pursue was essential, because skeptics and critics abounded. Amid protests over the Vietnam war and race riots, NASA engineers kept their heads down and their slide rules busy.
2. Harness incongruence. In any large organization there is pressure to suppress dissent. That can be deadly, as it was for NASA in the two space shuttle failures — Challenger and Columbia — each of which killed all seven crew members. Leading up to both tragedies, the fact that engineers grew concerned about a technical problem they did not fully understand, but they could not make a quantitative case; and were consequently ignored.
After the bad years of the shuttle disasters, the practice of harnessing incongruence, and learning from mistakes, has staged something of a revival at NASA, which has since successfully sent unmanned craft to Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Says Adam Stelzner, a NASA engineer, “Listen to all that the problem has to say, do not make assumptions or commit to a plan of action based on them until the deepest truth presents itself ”.
3. Delegate but decide. NASA realized early on that it needed help. About 90% of Apollo’s budget was spent on contractors from the most varied places. NASA itself was, therefore, more of a confederation than a single agency.
With so many players involved, turf wars were unavoidable. NASA Administrator James Webb coined the phrase Space Age Management to describe how he tried to manage conflicts and ensure final decisions were made by headquarters. Unfortunately, Webb’s mastery of the complex network was not as thorough as he believed. The death of three astronauts during a routine test in 1967 was traced to deficiencies Webb had been unaware of. Failure, in this case, was as instructive as success.
4. Effectiveness and elegance. Aesthetically, the Apollo mission was poor. The module that touched down on the moon looked like an oversize version of a kid’s cardboard science project, all right angles and skinny legs. Apollo’s return to Earth was equally unglamorous. The spaceship that left the launch pad was awesome; what was, by plan, to be rescued from the Pacific Ocean was a stubby cone weighing just 0.2% of the majestic original. But what looks clunky and awkward to an outsider may appear elegant to an engineer. Engineering inelegance, by contrast, would be redesigning a machine without fully anticipating the consequences.
Most of the people alive today had not yet arrived on the planet when Armstrong, Aldrin and Commander Michael Collins returned to it after their historic voyage. Never mind, though. The moon landing was a victory for all of the human race, past, present, and future.

(Peter Coy. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22.07.2019. Adapted.)

Um avião decola da cidade de Nova Iorque (75º O) em direção à cidade de Berlim (15º L) no dia 13.08.2019, às 14h00. O voo teve duração de 7 horas. Sabendo que os Estados Unidos e a Alemanha estavam no horário de verão, de março a outubro,

A imagem constitui o esboço de uma carta topográfica.

A escala, em cartografia, é a proporção entre a área real e a área representada no mapa. Há dois tipos de escala: a gráfica, representada a seguir, e a numérica.

O desmatamento de florestas tropicais

Em 1987, após a Convenção de Viena, foi assinado o Protocolo de Montreal, um tratado internacional que entrou em vigor em 1o de janeiro de 1989. Atualmente é o único acordo ambiental multilateral cuja adoção é universal: 197 estados assumiram o compromisso ambiental.

Entre os dias 23 e 28 de março deste ano, a Diretoria de Hidrografia e Navegação (DHN) previu e acompanhou a evolução da Tempestade Tropical “Iba”. Primeiro ciclone tropical a ser nomeado segundo a lista estabelecida em 2011, o fenômeno deixou a comunidade marítima em alerta e gerou grande interesse no público em geral.

Analise a representação da geração de um sismo.

No dia 31.03.2017 foi sancionada a lei que regulamenta a terceirização. Essa lei permite que empresas terceirizem a chamada atividade-fim, áreas principais das empresas, garantindo a prática também na administração pública. Neste caso, terceirizadas ficam autorizadas a subcontratar outras empresas para a execução dos serviços.

Hong Kong é uma anomalia histórica. Não só por causa de suas ruas dedicadas à monarquia britânica, povoadas de rostos asiáticos, ou suas famosas construções verticais; mas porque Hong Kong é uma Região Administrativa Especial da China, aberta e moderna, apesar de ser controlada pelo regime chinês, um dos países mais poderosos do mundo. As 11 semanas de protestos ilustram o choque entre dois sistemas políticos, um confronto que cresce sob a ameaça de uma intervenção militar de Pequim.

Criado em 1991 pelo Tratado de Assunção, o Mercosul é hoje o terceiro maior bloco do mundo, depois do Nafta (México, Estados Unidos e Canadá) e da União Europeia. Seu PIB total é de US$ 2,8 trilhões (R$ 10,4 trilhões). Se fosse um país, o Mercosul seria a quinta maior economia do mundo, atrás apenas de Estados Unidos, China, Japão e Alemanha.

No apagar das luzes de um governo eleito em 2015 para tirar a Argentina do lamaçal econômico [...], a inflação passa dos 50%, o desemprego em 2019 chegou a 10%, a taxa de juros alcança 72% ao ano e a economia em geral, que recuou 2,5% em 2018, deve ir mais para trás ainda neste ano.

Observe o cartaz do documentário Jango, de 1984, dirigido por Sílvio Tendler.

O movimento em prol dos direitos civis alcançou o seu apogeu entre 1963 e 1965. Em maio de 1963, o centro simbólico do movimento foi Birmingham, Alabama; ali, a polícia empregou uma violência brutal contra os ativistas. Mesmo que a realidade desses fatos já fosse por si mesma escandalosa, foi uma das primeiras vezes que imagens televisivas galvanizaram a opinião em vários países a poucas horas do ocorrido: a imagem da polícia sulista empregando cães e mangueira d’água contra crianças negras era difícil de esquecer.

Com efeito, coexistindo duas regiões dentro de uma mesma economia — integradas pelo mesmo sistema monetário — o salário de subsistência da população tende a ser relativamente mais elevado ali onde é mais baixa a produtividade do homem ocupado na produção de alimentos. A coexistência das duas regiões numa mesma economia tem consequências práticas de grande importância. Assim, o fluxo de mão de obra da região de mais baixa produtividade para a de mais alta tenderá a pressionar sobre o nível de salários desta última, impedindo que os mesmos acompanhem a elevação da produtividade.

Com a vitória do general Francisco Franco na Guerra Civil espanhola (1936-1939), milhares de refugiados espanhóis procuraram asilo no território francês. Os jornais da extrema direita francesa comentaram a chegada dos republicanos espanhóis.
[...] na extrema direita, a publicação do Partido Social Francês, Le Petit Journal, [afirma] que “a derrocada dos marxistas espanhóis” impõe a proteção do território. “O exército do crime está na França. O que você fará a respeito?” é a manchete do semanário antissemita Gringoire. No dia 8 de fevereiro, o jornal literário Candide tocou o alarme: “Toda a escória, toda a gentalha de Barcelona, todos os assassinos, os comunistas, os carrascos, os profanadores, todos os ladrões, todos os hereges saqueadores, todos os amotinados sem escrúpulos explodiram em nosso solo”. [...] O Action Française, uma “publicação do nacionalismo integral”, pragueja: “A França real não quer servir de depósito para criminosos e assassinos”.

Com a repetição da crise econômica em 1937 e a aproximação da guerra, não admira que o Estado parecesse melhor preparado do que os empresários para resolver o problema da estagnação e incentivar a rápida industrialização. Quando se verificou ser um erro a reaplicação da teoria do comércio liberal, depois da guerra, os controles foram reassumidos por um governo [...] que se viu também obrigado, por falta de alternativa, a chamar o capital estrangeiro nas condições por ele impostas.

Observe a capa do livro Assim falou Juca Pato, de Belmonte, publicado em primeira edição em 1933.

O contrato de trabalho na fazenda de café paulista consistia no pagamento anual de uma certa quantia por cada mil pés de café cuidados [...]. O colono ainda recebia uma quantia estipulada por alqueire (medida) de café colhido. [...] O que tinha uma importância extraordinária no sistema de trabalho nas fazendas paulistas era, entretanto, a possibilidade de plantar produtos de subsistência entre os cafeeiros e a obtenção de um pedaço de terra com essa finalidade, além de um pasto para alguns animais.

[...] no final do século XIX [...] discursos “científicos” estabelecem, a partir de características físicas e culturais, uma classificação dos povos e uma desigualdade das raças. [...] Mas são sobretudo as revistas de geografia e de etnografia que influenciam os colonos, ao refletir sobre os melhores métodos para “civilizar nossos negros”. Considera-se, de fato, que os povos que não pertencem à “raça” branca são atrasados, infantilizados.

Leia uma passagem do livro Memórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, de Machado de Assis, publicado em primeira edição em 1881. O trecho citado passa-se na década de 1840 e apresenta a voz de um personagem indignado com o momento histórico brasileiro.
Opinava por várias coisas, entre outras, o desenvolvimento do tráfico dos africanos e a expulsão dos ingleses. [...] Que os levasse o diabo os ingleses! Isto não ficava direito sem irem todos eles barra fora. Que é que a Inglaterra podia fazer-nos? Se ele encontrasse algumas pessoas de boa vontade, era obra de uma noite a expulsão de tais godemes¹... Graças a Deus, tinha patriotismo.

¹ Godemes: neologismo de grande circulação na cultura brasileira do período. Fusão de duas palavras inglesas, “god” (Deus) e “demon” (demônio).

A primeira medida importante tomada pelo Príncipe-Regente após sua chegada foi o Alvará de 1.^o de abril de 1808. O propósito fundamental do ato legislativo era promover a industrialização do Brasil. Alguns importantes incentivos foram concedidos por meio do Alvará de 28 de abril de 1809: isenção de imposto de exportação para manufaturados nacionais, uso obrigatório de bens nacionais pelas tropas reais e a distribuição anual de 60 mil cruzados entre os industriais na tecelagem de algodão, lã e seda.

Podem-se apanhar muitos fatos da vida daqueles sertanejos dizendo que atravessaram a época do couro. De couro era a porta das cabanas, o rude leito aplicado ao chão duro, e mais tarde a cama para os partos; de couro todas as cordas, a borracha para carregar água, o mocó ou alforge para levar comida, a maca para guardar roupa, a mochila para milhar cavalo, a peia para prendê-lo em viagem, as bainhas de faca, as broacas e surrões, a roupa de entrar no mato, os banguês para curtume ou para apurar sal.

De maneira geral, a conquista progrediu com mais rapidez e mostrou-se mais eficiente contra os Estados indígenas organizados, uma vez que estes se renderam aos espanhóis como entidades unificadas. Quando caía uma capital urbana, todo o território imperial perdia muito do seu poder de resistência.

Por volta do final do século XVI, teve início uma transformação profunda no gênero de vida das classes privilegiadas. Os castelos deixaram de ser fortalezas e se tornaram residências de lazer no campo. Seus fossos foram cobertos e suas torres transformaram-se em ornamentos. As famílias ricas tinham, além disso, solares na cidade, onde passavam uma parte do ano. Os divertimentos tornaram-se menos guerreiros, o torneio foi substituído pelo carrossel, exercício de habilidades a cavalo, vindo da Itália. O jogo de combate transformouse na esgrima com espada, de origem italiana, modificada na França.

Aqueles que compõem a cidade, tão diferentes entre si por suas origens, condições e funções, de certa forma parecem “semelhantes” uns aos outros. Essa similitude funda a unidade da pólis, porque para os gregos somente os semelhantes podem permanecer mutuamente unidos pela Philia, associados a uma mesma comunidade. Todos aqueles que participam do Estado definem-se como Homoioi, semelhantes, depois de maneira mais abstrata, como Isoi, iguais. Essa imagem das relações humanas encontrará no século VI a.C. a sua expressão rigorosa no conceito de isonomia: igual participação de todos os cidadãos no exercício do poder.

O fixismo, o lamarckismo e o darwinismo são formas de pensamento científico que propõem alternativas para a compreensão da existência das inúmeras espécies em nosso planeta, de que forma elas surgiram e como se relacionam com o ambiente.

Em moscas Drosophila melanogaster, a cor dos olhos e o comprimento das asas são determinados, respectivamente, pelos genes R e E, conforme a tabela 1.

Pedro é afetado por uma doença recessiva ligada ao sexo. Ele casou-se com Olívia, cujo irmão era a única pessoa de sua família que tinha a mesma doença de Pedro.

O gás carbônico proveniente das células dos tecidos do corpo humano difunde-se para o líquido intersticial e atinge os capilares sanguíneos.

A figura representa uma estrutura em formato helicoidal que confere uma importante adaptação a um animal.

A figura mostra uma planta cultivada em vaso de vidro transparente que contém água e todos os nutrientes necessários à sobrevivência do vegetal. O caule e a raiz foram iluminados unilateralmente. Ao longo dos dias, verificou-se o crescimento do caule em direção à luz e da raiz contra a luz.

Uma criança nasceu com um defeito em uma de suas valvas cardíacas. Essa valva não se fecha por completo durante a sístole cardíaca, o que ocasiona retorno de sangue arterial.

Em um experimento, coletaram-se paramécios de um rio, que foram distribuídos em dois frascos, 1 e 2. No frasco 1 foi adicionada água do mar e no frasco 2 foi adicionada água destilada. Monitorou-se a frequência de contrações dos vacúolos pulsáteis dos paramécios de ambos os frascos.

No ciclo de vida das plantas há alternância das gerações de organismos haploides e diploides.

A figura mostra uma técnica biotecnológica de manipulação de células para a produção de um embrião resultante da fusão entre um óvulo anucleado e o núcleo de uma célula somática.

Os seres procariotos são bastante diversificados quanto aos processos bioquímicos de obtenção de energia para a manutenção do metabolismo celular. A equação da reação química a seguir ocorre em alguns procariotos que participam de uma das etapas do ciclo do nitrogênio.

A doença é percebida quando a perda de sangue começa a causar palidez, desânimo, dificuldade de raciocínio, cansaço e fraqueza — por isso o apelido “amarelão”. Esses sintomas prejudicam a capacidade de trabalho e aprendizagem.

A figura mostra onze espécies de lagartos do gênero Anolis encontradas na ilha de Porto Rico. Cada espécie vive em uma região preferencial da vegetação, que é definida pelo tipo e altura das plantas, intensidade de luz solar e umidade, entre outros fatores.

Cientistas monitoraram uma população de roedores, constituída por poucos indivíduos, que se instalou em uma área com abundância de recursos. O gráfico representa possíveis curvas de crescimento dessa população de roedores ao longo do tempo.

A figura indica os gráficos de uma reta r e uma senoide s, de equações y = 5/2 e y = 1 + 3 sen (2x), em um plano cartesiano de eixos ortogonais.

A figura indica o retângulo FAME e o losango MERP desenhados, respectivamente, em uma parede e no chão a ela perpendicular. O ângulo mede 120º, ME = 2m e a área do retângulo FAME é igual a 12m².

Renato comprou um carro por R$ 19.000,00. Meses depois, vendeu o carro para seu primo por R$ 20.000,00. Passados mais alguns meses, Renato recomprou o carro do seu primo por R$ 20.500,00 e, em seguida, o vendeu para outra pessoa por R$ 22.000,00.

José deseja fazer uma poupança mensal durante 10 anos, sempre acrescentando 0,5% a mais em relação ao valor poupado no mês anterior.

Seja k um número real e um sistema de equações nas incógnitas x e y. Os valores de k para que a solução gráfica desse sistema pertença ao interior do terceiro quadrante do plano cartesiano são dados pelo intervalo

Admita que cada um dos tons de qualquer uma das três cores primárias seja definido por um número inteiro de 0 a 255. Sobrepondo-se duas cores primárias diferentes, com seus respectivos tons, o resultado sempre será uma cor inédita. Sobrepondo-se uma cor primária a ela mesma, o resultado será uma cor inédita apenas quando a sobreposição for entre cores primárias iguais mas de tons diferentes.

Em um plano cartesiano, dois vértices de um triângulo equilátero estão sobre a reta de equação y = 2x – 2. O terceiro vértice desse triângulo está sobre a reta de equação y = 2x + 2.

Dado um número real x, o símbolo [x] indica o maior número inteiro que é menor ou igual a x.

Dois cubos idênticos, de aresta igual a 1 dm, foram unidos com sobreposição perfeita de duas das suas faces. P é vértice de um dos cubos, Q é vértice do outro cubo e R é vértice compartilhado por ambos os cubos, conforme indica a figura.

Observe o padrão da sequência de figuras.

O gráfico mostra a intensidade da corrente elétrica que percorre o filamento de uma pequena lâmpada incandescente em função da diferença de potencial aplicada entre seus terminais.

Nas Ciências, muitas vezes, se inicia o estudo de um problema fazendo uma aproximação simplificada. Um desses casos é o estudo do comportamento da membrana celular devido à distribuição do excesso de íons positivos e negativos em torno dela. A figura mostra a visão geral de uma célula e a analogia entre o modelo biológico e o modelo físico, o qual corresponde a duas placas planas e paralelas, eletrizadas com cargas elétricas de tipos opostos.

Nos equipamentos eletrônicos que emitem ondas sonoras, geralmente, há um dispositivo que permite controlar o volume do som.

No dia 20 de junho de 1969, o ser humano caminhou pela primeira vez na superfície lunar. Em uma das fotos registradas nesse dia pode-se ver uma imagem direita e menor formada pela superfície convexa do visor do capacete do astronauta Edwin Aldrin, que funciona como um espelho.

Colocou-se certa massa de água a 80 ºC em um recipiente de alumínio de massa 420 g que estava à temperatura de 20 ºC. Após certo tempo, a temperatura do conjunto atingiu o equilíbrio em 70 ºC.

A oxigenoterapia hiperbárica é uma modalidade terapêutica na qual o paciente respira oxigênio puro (100%), enquanto é submetido a uma pressão cerca de 2 a 3 vezes a pressão atmosférica ao nível do mar, no interior de uma câmara hiperbárica. Essa terapia provoca um aumento espetacular na quantidade de oxigênio transportado pelo sangue, na ordem de 20 vezes o volume que circula em indivíduos que estão respirando ar ao nível do mar, o que produzirá no paciente uma série de efeitos de interesse terapêutico.
A câmara hiperbárica consiste em um equipamento médico fechado, resistente à pressão, geralmente de formato cilíndrico, construído de aço ou acrílico e que pode ser pressurizado com ar comprimido ou oxigênio puro.

Um satélite geoestacionário é aquele que se encontra parado em relação a um ponto sobre a superfície da Terra. Se a Terra fosse perfeitamente esférica, com distribuição homogênea de massa, esses pontos só poderiam estar no plano que contém a Linha do Equador terrestre. Na realidade, os satélites geoestacionários encontram-se sobre pontos ligeiramente fora desse plano.

Um automóvel trafegava com velocidade constante por uma avenida plana e horizontal quando foi atingido na traseira por outro automóvel, que trafegava na mesma direção e sentido, também com velocidade constante. Após a colisão, os automóveis ficaram unidos e passaram a se mover com a mesma velocidade.

Em um local em que a aceleração gravitacional vale 10m/s², uma pessoa eleva um objeto de peso 400 N por meio de uma roldana fixa, conforme mostra a figura, utilizando uma corda que suporta, no máximo, uma tração igual a 520 N.

Existem várias versões do Caminho de Santiago, que são trajetos percorridos anualmente por milhares de peregrinos que se dirigem à cidade de Santiago de Compostela, na Espanha, com a finalidade de venerar o apóstolo Santiago Maior. Considere que uma pessoa percorreu um desses caminhos em 32 dias, andando a distância total de 800 km e caminhando com velocidade média de 3,0 km/h.

Um hidrocarboneto insaturado, ao sofrer oxidação com permanganato de potássio em meio ácido, produziu três compostos diferentes, conforme a equação:

O urânio-235, ao ser bombardeado por um nêutron , forma dois nuclídeos radioativos: o bário-144, que decai emitindo partículas beta , e o nuclídeo X. Esse bombardeamento produz também três nêutrons, que colidirão com outros núcleos de urânio, causando uma reação em cadeia.

A figura representa uma célula galvânica constituída por um eletrodo padrão de hidrogênio mergulhado em uma solução com [H⁺] = 1,0 mol/L e por um eletrodo de ouro mergulhado em solução contendo íons Fe²⁺ e íons Fe³⁺.

(https://mycourses.aalto.fi. Adaptado.)

Considere os eletrodos de platina e de ouro inertes e os potenciais de redução das espécies químicas presentes nas soluções:

A decomposição térmica do carbonato de zinco (ZnCO₃) em seus óxidos tem uma entalpia positiva de 71,5 kJ/mol de ZnCO₃.

Uma solução de hidróxido de sódio (NaOH) apresenta pH igual a 9. Considerando-se o valor de K_w igual a 10^–14, a concentração de íons OH^– nessa solução é igual a

A tabela apresenta as pressões de vapor, à mesma temperatura, de três substâncias polares I, II e III.

O óxido de propileno é uma substância utilizada na produção de polímeros, como o poliuretano. Sua fórmula estrutural está representada a seguir.

Considere a tabela, que apresenta propriedades físicas das substâncias I, II, III e IV.

Um resíduo de 200 mL de solução de ácido sulfúrico (H₂SO₄), de concentração 0,1 mol/L, precisava ser neutralizado antes do descarte. Para tanto, foi utilizado bicarbonato de sódio (NaHCO₃), conforme a equação a seguir:

As fotocélulas são dispositivos utilizados como substitutos de interruptores que acendem as lâmpadas de uma casa ou de postes na rua. Esses dispositivos baseiam seu funcionamento no efeito fotoelétrico, como ilustra a figura.

Uma das questões ainda não respondidas pela Ciência é sobre a origem dos vírus, se teriam surgido antes ou depois das primeiras células procariontes. Os pesquisadores apontam evidências e apresentam argumentos em favor de cada uma das hipóteses, mas ainda não há resposta definitiva sobre o tema. Em uma discussão entre dois alunos sobre qual dos micro-organismos surgiu primeiro no mundo, bactérias ou vírus, cinco argumentos foram apresentados.

A genealogia ilustra uma família em que as pessoas destacadas apresentam uma doença autossômica monogênica.

A figura ilustra, de forma simplificada, a reprodução de um pinheiro.

Astyanax mexicanus é uma espécie de peixe sem olhos, que vive em águas tropicais de cavernas do México. Heterocephalus glaber é a espécie do rato-toupeira-pelado, um mamífero roedor que também não tem olhos e é encontrado em tocas escavadas no solo africano. A semelhança quanto à ausência da visão nesses animais pode ser considerada uma adaptação aos ambientes em que eles vivem, que selecionaram essas características.

O esterco de galinha contém fezes e excretas nitrogenadas, que podem ser utilizadas para adubar o solo.

O gráfico ilustra a variação da taxa metabólica de um animal em relação à variação da temperatura ambiente.

Na orelha humana encontram-se os ossículos martelo, bigorna e estribo, que são essenciais ao fenômeno da audição.
Essas estruturas ficam localizadas na orelha __________, apresentam células derivadas do tecido______________ e são ricas em_____________.

Não é indicado que mulheres gestantes tomem a vacina tríplice viral, que protege contra sarampo, caxumba e rubéola, porque alguns dos seus componentes poderiam causar malformações ao feto. Caso uma gestante adquira sarampo, existe uma medida excepcional de tratamento, que consiste na aplicação, por via intravenosa e em qualquer fase da gestação, de imunoglobulinas extraídas do sangue de doadores.